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This report puts Ethiopia's population at 37.5 million in 
1979 and 40.9 million in 1987. The Ethiopian govern-
ment has estimated its 1987 population at 45.9 million, 
a figure accepted as generally valid by the World Bank 
and most other aid donors. 
Faught, op cit., pp. iii/iv. 
Henze, "~thiopia's Economic Prospects for the 1990s," p. 3. 
International Labor Organization, Socialism from the 
<?rass _Ro?ts,: Accumulation, Employment and Equity 
in Ethiopia, p. 397, cited in Clapham, op cit., p. 145. 
Jember, "A Case Study of the Health Component of 
Kebelle 41", cited in Clapham, op cit., p. 145. 
Faught, op cit., pp. iii/iv. 
Clapham, op cit., p. 175. 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, Address to the National 
Shengo, September 1987, cited in Clapham o>p cit p 176. , ., . 
Dr. Daniel Teferrra, "Performance of Ethiopia's Socialist 
Economy", paper prepared for A Discussion Roundtable 
on Ethiopia, Orkand Corporation, November 99, 1989. 
Clapham, op cit., pp. 174-179, offers an excellent analy-
sis of the villagization program. 
"Orga~izat~onal ~tatement" issued by the Tigray 
People~ L1~erat1on Front, Voice of the Tigray 
Revolution m Amharic to Ethiopia 0400 GMT 21 
October 89, FBIS-AFR-89-204, 24 October 1989. 
"Orga_niz~tion~l Statement" issued by the Tigray 
Peoples L1berat10n Front, op cit. 
Programme of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary · 
Democratic Front, op cit. 
For example, a TPLF spokesman in Washington recent-
ly told the writer that while it has a Marxist-Leninist 
party organization, the TPLF does not believe in trying 
to ~PP_ly Marxist-Leninist agricultural policies to 
Eth10pia. :8e argued that individual farming and free 
market pnces are the only way to stimulate agricultural 
production. 
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CENTRAL AMERICA: 
LEARNING FROM THE LEGACY 
By Morris J. Blachman and Kenneth E. Sharpe* 
INTRODUCTION 
Ronald Reagan's entry into the White House signaled, 
in Arthur Schlesinger's words, "the seizure of foreign policy by 
a boarding party of ideologies."1 Despite some moves toward 
pragmatism-in international economics and trade, European 
affairs and nuclear arms negotizations, he kept Latin 
American foreign policy largely in the hands of anti-communist 
zealots-moral messianists who eschewed pragmatism and 
realism. Areas of relatively minor priority, like Nicaragua, 
were suddenly blown up into major issues around which there 
was little rational debate about national interest or policy 
effectiveness.2 Meanwhile, truly serious problems, like the 
threat unmanageable debt poses to development and democra-
cy in countries like Brazil, Argentina and Mexico received 
scant attention. 
The opportunities for the new Bush administration to 
readjust priorities and formulate wise policies were enhanced by 
changing conditions in the region. The commitment to regional 
solutions by important actors like Mexico and Venezuela, and by 
the Central Americans themselves, has increased the possibility 
for peaceful settlement to long-standing conflicts. Changes in 
Soviet foreign policy have created possibilities to further mini-
mize the insertion of East-West issues in what have been pri-
marily internal regional conflicts. 
Back in the U.S., the bitterness and rancor generated 
*Morris J. Blachman is associate director of the Institute of 
International Studies at the University of South Carolina (Columbia). He has 
done extensive fieldwork and writing on U.S. foreign policy in Central America. 
Kenneth E. Sharpe is professor of political science at Swarthmore College. He 
has written extensively on the political economy of Mexico, Central America 
and the Caribbean. Professors Blachman and Sharpe are the editors, with 
,William- .M ... LeoGrande (American University), of Confronting Reuolution: 
Security Through Diplomacy in Central America (New York: Pantheon, 1986). 
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by Reagan's policies helped create a constituency for leaders 
who would pursue peace and security through diplomacy, and 
who would tackle difficult problems with honesty and clarity. 
But forging new policies first demands an honest look 
at a reality often distorted by rhetoric and hyperbole. Further, 
both liberals and conservatives must face the difficult, hard to 
accept, lessons of recent experience. Finally, policy makers 
must be ready to confront quickly the domestic and regional 
obstacles that could rapidly overwhelm the soundest of pro-
grams. 
THE LEGACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
A decade of intense policy focus on Central America by 
both the Carter and Reagan Administrations did little to alle-
viate the problems of war, underdevelopment, and abuse of 
power the people in the region have faced. 
El Salvador is still plagued by a costly civil war. The 
Christian Democratic Government of Jose Napoleon Duarte, 
long Washington's hope for a moderate, reformist alternative, 
suffered serious erosion of support because of corruption. fail-
ure to deliver on promised reform, and inability to end the war. 
Consequently, the Christian Democrats were so widely discre-
dited that the ultra-rightist ARENA party won a majority of 
seats in the March 1988 Assembly elections. Instead of pulling 
together, the party factions fractured further which led to an 
easy victory for ARENA in the 1989 presidential elections. 
Political groups on the left, including the FDR, an ally of the 
guerrilla FMLN, played a modest role in the elections, but 
harassment, repression, intimidation and impeded access to 
full participation kept them from mounting a serious chal-
lenge. The insistence of these groups on a negotiated solution 
to the civil war was perceived as a severe threat to the military 
and the right, whose tolerance for such dissent is severely lim-
ited. Meanwhile, moderate and Jeft leaning labor and peasant 
organizations began discussing how to coordinate their resis-
tance to the increased .repression they had forecast would 
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accompany an ARENA victory. U.S. policy now confronts an El 
Salvador with continuing polarization, a no win military situa-
tion, and increasing repression by an ultra rightist government 
whose leaders have been closely associated with death squad 
activities and whose programs represent an oligarchic reaction 
. to the mild reforms of the Duarte era. 
In Guatemala, efforts by Christian Democratic 
· President Vinicio Cerezo to check military abuses of power, 
open dialogue with insurgent forces and push reforms, trig-
gered a May 1988 coup by hard-line military officers strongly 
supported by reactionary business elites. It failed to overthrow 
the government, but it marked the end of any likelihood that 
the military would allow a genuine reformist civilian govern-
ment to take power, not just office. While labor and peasant 
organizations have continued their efforts to reorganize-they 
were decimated in the early 1980's by military repression, con-
tinued death squad activities, an attack which forced the clos-
ing of the leftist opposition magazine La Epoca, and govern-
ment timidity on reforms, all indicative of the power and deter-
mination of the coup supporters to maintain control. 
Honduras continues to be in difficult economic straits 
and is kept afloat by infusions of U.S. aid. Political and press 
freedom remain far greater in its northern neighbors, but elec-
tions have neither led to reform nor weakened the control of a 
corrupt military; and there has been some evidence of deep 
involvement in narcotics trafficking amongst high officers. 
What's more, there is growing resentment about the pro-consul 
attitude of the U.S. The failure of the police to respond for two 
and a half hours to the April 1988 anti-U.S. riots which burned 
the Embassy annex, indicates how deeply the resentment had 
spread into the military itself. The military and most other sec-
tors are deeply worried that the presence of the contra force, or 
its remnants, in Honduras could spawn marauding bandits 
who would be a destablizing force for years to come. 
In Costa Rica, the only stable ~emocracy in the region, 
the U.S. had been at loggerheads with the government of 
Oscar Arias because of his refusal to support the contra policy. 
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Actions against that government-forcing out the Costa Rican 
Ambassador for "lobbying" Congress against the contra policy, 
for example--slowly chilled relations with a government, that 
by all of Washington's policy pronouncements, the U.S. should 
be fully backing in the region. 
And in Nicaragua the contra policy not only sacrificed 
p_eace fo_r war and undermined development programs, but by 
further mserting East-West issues into the conflict, the U.S., in 
effect, encouraged the Nicaraguans to militarize, to seek 
increased Soviet arms shipments, and to maintain the pres-
ence of Cuban Advisors. Nicaragua successfully contained the 
contras militarily, but the war (which, at times, absorbed up to 
62% of the national budget) so deepened economic problems 
that stabilization became the government's number one priori-
ty. Major stabilization and adjustment programs initially insti-
tuted in February and June of 1988 placed a renewed empha-
sis on Market principles and accepted stiff IMF type medicine 
(without IMF monetary support). Though the Sandinistas con-
tinued staunchly to resist efforts to force or negotiate them out 
of power, they have backed regional peace efforts that recog-
nized their legitimacy, such as the Esquipulas II accords signed 
by the five Central American presidents in August 1987. This 
agreement, plus official concern to ease economic pressures 
and restart reform programs, spurred a major policy change in 
early 1988 when the Sandinistas agreed to negotiate directly 
with the contras leading to cease fire accords signed in Sapoa 
in March 1988. The recent Tela accords which the Sandinistas 
signed set into motion a potential process for demobilizing the 
contras, holding another round of presidential elections and 
· beginning the long road to reconstruction of Nicaragua's devas-
tated economy. Much of its success depends on the degree to 
which the U.S. becomes a serious supporter of the efforts of the 
Central Americans to use diplomacy and to resolve their prob-
lems themselves. 
Meanwhile our major regional and European allies 
have seen the U.S. as scuttling attempts to negotiate peace 
and security agreements. Time and again countries like 
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Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina, and the five presi-
dents of Central America, have said that the situation contin-
ues to deteriorate because the United States follows a policy 
based on military not political solutions to the conflicts in the 
region. Their efforts to create alternatives have provided the 
United States with a number of opportunities to forge a new 
.partnership in the region, to add our great influence and 
strength to their leverage in creating a situation which will 
serve our national interests, and theirs. Such an opportunity 
faces the Bush Administration, but seizing this opportunity 
first demands we learn some important lessons based on the 
recent experience in Central America. 
LESSONS 
Central America has long occupied a "special" place in 
American foreign policy. As President Calvin Coolidge stated in 
April 1927, "Toward the governments of countries ... this side of 
Panama we feel a moral responsibility that does not attach to 
other nations." It was left to his Undersecretary of State to 
make clear just what this "moral responsibility" meant: "We do 
control the destinies of Central America and we do so for the 
simple reason that the national interest absolutely dictates 
such a course. "3 
For over 40 years now, our principal efforts to "control 
the destinies" have been designed to prevent or reverse leftist 
revolutions.4 Many policy makers have simply assumed that 
any such revolutions are tantamount to a Soviet penetration of 
our border, threatening our vital national interest. The "loss" 
of Cuba, even more than the "loss" of China, became the sym-
bol of the danger, of lost prestige, and for inoculating "never a-
gain" into the national political psyche. 
Conservatives, mostly Republicans, argued that the pri-
mary cause of upheaval was, as John Foster Dulles put 
it," alien intrigue and treachery," a danger "originating outside 
the hemisphere." They put forth policies relying primarily on 
force to eliminate the turmoil and establish order. Liberals,. 
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mostly Democrats, claimed the primary cause was p~verty, 
inequality, and repression-exacerbated, perhaps by the 
Soviets or their allies. They recommended political pressure 
and economic assistance to undermine revolution from below 
by bringing about reform from above. Both sides perceived 
themselves as helping the anti-Communist-and therefore pre-
sumed to be democratic-forces, and they bristled when 
charged with "intervening" or attempting to "control internal 
affairs." But such policies inevitably involved the U.S. in man-
aging the internal affairs of these countries to prevent revolu-
tion. 5 In practice, each administration's policies have been a 
mix of conservative and liberal policies. Eisenhower, Nixon and 
Reagan emphasized the former: Kennedy, J~hnson and Carter, 
the latter. 
The past ten years of U.S. policy toward Central 
America demonstrate that both approaches are seriously 
flawed, and mixing them together can create a costly, contra-
dictory and counterproductive concoction. They teach us 
lessons about the causes of, and threat posed by, revolution; 
the efficacy of methods we use to combat revolution-rollback 
and containment mixed with economic assistance; the effec-
tiveness of mu~tilateral diplomacy for resolving the crisis; and 
finally, about the domestic consequences of our foreign policy. 
1. Nationalism outweighs internationalism in leftist rev· 
olutionary regimes. 
This is an old lesson, already appreciated in U.S. rela-
tions with countries like Yugoslavia and China. But it could be 
learned again from the Nicaraguan experience: the 
Sandinistas are far more Nicaraguan than they are Soviet or 
Cuban, their Marxist rhetoric notwithstanding. Policy makers 
have sometimes not been able to see this lesson, because they 
wrongly assume that public doctrine is a more reliable indica-
tor of a regime's character than its behavior. The economic 
models they have followed, for all their failures, have not been 
replicas (and were often rejections) of Soviet or Cuban ones: 
their reliance on cooperative and private, not state farms; their 
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mixed economy which left the majority ofland and indus.tIJ: in 
private hands; the institut~o~s they cr~ate~ .for negotiat~ng 
with private growers assoc1at1ons. Their wrllmgness to sign 
verifiable security agreements with the U.S., including 
removal of foreign advisors, limits on arms acquisitions, and 
.guarantees of no foreign military bases is another indication. 
Concrete efforts to reduce border tensions, minimize fears of 
·aggression, and establish reasonable economic rela~ions with 
their neighbors belie the "inevitability" of commumst expan· 
sionism assumed by those who by focusing on doctrinaire inter-
pretations of ideology do not see the nationalistic behavior.6 
2. Internal conditions of inequity and repression are far 
more fundamental in causing and sustaining revolu· 
tions than external support. 
The guerrilla war did not begin in El Salvador because 
of external support; and after ten years of stalemate there is no 
evidence that external assistance from Cuba, Nicaragua, or the 
Soviet Union is a major factor. (Which is not to say that there 
is not external financing or assistance). Far more inrportant in 
sustaining the civil war has been the unwillingness of the 
Salvadoran military and government to bring about significant 
reform and end repression. It has not been possible for the best 
intentioned moderates---here or in Central America-to engi-
neer reform from above in order to pre-empt revolution from 
below. The power and recalcitrance of the military and eco-
nomic elites who control the mechanisms of repression and 
institutions which most need reform has simply been too great. 
What's more, they have learned to adapt to external pressures 
without ceding basic controJ.7 
3. Arming exiles to "rollback" revolutionary regimes is a 
counterproductive and costly policy. 
The failure in 1961 at the Bay of Pigs should have served 
as an early warning: if a revolution is popular internally and 
strong organizationally, an exile army is not going to generate an 
uprising. In Nicaragua, despite internal opposition, the 
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Sandinistas enjoyed substantial support, where well organized, 
and had important European, Latin American and Soviet bloc 
SUJ?port. On the other hand, the initial role of Somocistas, the 
reliance. on ruthless attacks against civilians, and the obvious 
subservience of the contras to Reagan Administration policy 
prevented the translation of domestic hardships or disaffection 
with the Sandinistas into contra support. 
Moreover, the rollback policy has been costly in terms of 
U.S. interests. It encouraged a closing of political space within 
Nicaragua; led to border tensions with Honduras and strength-
ened the military there against its civilian government; dis-
rupted regional trade and discouraged investment, both impor-
tant to the economic recovery of the whole region; undermined 
our moral authority and credibility in Latin America and 
Europe; and at home in the U.S., it not only encouraged rancor 
and division, but diverted attention from dealing with other 
really important issues in Mexico and South America. As 
Oscar Arias pointed out, "you must remember, it is easy to con-
vert your best friends into your worst enemies." The U.S. 
should, he said," concentrate on a dialogue with us-not the 
use of force." 
4. Aid to local militaries fails to provide a shield for 
reform, eliminate the root causes of revolution or defeat 
the insurgency. 
In El Salvador, despite massive aid and coun-
terinsurgency training for the military, the evidence of the past 
decade confirms a March, 1987 study by four U.S. lieutenant 
colonels at Harvard's JFK School of Government. "The 
FMLN-tough, competent, highly motivated-can sustain its 
current strategy indefinitely. The Salvadorans have yet to 
devise a persuasive formula for wining the war .... the war in El 
Salvador is stuck; unhappily the United States finds itself 
stuck with the war." The recent insurrection proved this point 
once again. 
The carrot of U.S. aid was sufficient to bring about elec-
tions that initially put Christian Democratic reformer Duarte 
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into office, but it could not put him in power. U.S. pressure got 
the Salvadoran military to reduce murder by death squads, but 
present as well as past arbitrary arrest, detention without 
trial, torture, and disappearance of labor and peasant leaders 
continue unabated and goes unpunished-50,000 noncombat-
ants have been murdered without a single member of the 
Salvadoran security forces ever having been tried, much less 
convicted or incarcerated, for these killings. Despite U.S. aid, 
the police forces are part of the problem and the judiciary, so 
intimidated by threats and even assassination, has been para-
lyzed. Consequently, these actions continue with impunity, 
reinforcing the traditional cycle of repression followed by reac-
tion followed by more repression. Efforts at genuine reform are 
thus severely restricted, whether seeking political negotiations 
to end the war, improved salaries and wages, credit and techni-
cal assistance for land reform, or a diversion of expenditures 
from war to development. 
The Guatemalan military has been able to contain, not 
defeat, the insurgency there. The techniques it used-eliminat-
ing reformers in parties, unions and peasant organizations; 
killing Indians in the highlands, on whom the guerrillas 
depended for support; forcing tens of thousands to take refuge 
in Mexico or in military controlled "model villages"-allowed it 
to create a cemetery-like peace. But years of U.S. aid did little 
to change the internal conditions or help break the cycle of 
repression, reactions, repression. Today important elements in 
the military, together with a powerful, recalcitrant private sec-
tor are still able to block the reform efforts of President 
' . Cerezo. As Cerezo enters the final months of his term, the 
repression has been increasing once again. 
5. Mixing economic aid with rollback and containment 
policies contributes more to prosecution of hostilities 
than to needed structural reforms and economic devel-
opment. 
The U.S. bankrolls El Salvador. The $608 million we 
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provided in 1988 was 105% of what the Salvadorans them-
selves contributed for the governmental budget. U.S. dollars do 
precious little to address the need to reform the root causes of 
the war: 75% of U.S. aid went either to fight the war or to 
repair its effects. As long as a large military has to be support-
ed, the infrastructure and harvests are destroyed, and capital 
flight continues relatively unabated, resources will inevitably 
be diverted to finance the war effort. The experience of these 
past several years has confirmed the argument made in the 
Kissinger Commission Report that economic development and 
progress require peace first. B 
Economic development is difficult to attain even under 
the best of circumstances. Economic assistance, such as the 
Alliance for Progress, helped stimulate rapid export led growth 
in the 1950-1980 period. But, its effect was to force thousands 
of small farmers off the land to make way for large, commer-
cial farms; create widespread unemployment; swell already 
overcrowded urban slums; and create higher prices for basic 
food stuffs. The rigid, highly skewed social structure and lack 
of government commitment to reform meant the benefits of 
growth did not trickle down. Instead, those conditions spurred 
movements for reform which, when they were repressed, shift-
ed to revolution. A policy that simply "throws money" at prob-
lems of poverty, independent of the character of the regime, is 
naive, wasteful and potentially dangerous. It may support 
growth that leads only to armed insurrection and strengthen 
the power of exactly those elites that oppose broadly shared 
development. 
6. Multilateral diplomacy often works far better than 
unilateral force.in securing U.S. interests. 
The record on Nicaragua is clear; there is a direct corre-
lation between political and multilateral initiatives and the 
opening of political space in the country. Conversely, military 
pressure over the past decade has tended to lead to a closing of 
political space and a tightening of restrictions by the 
Sandinistas. The agreements of the five presidents at 
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Esquipulas in August 1987, and the cease fire accord th!s 
spawned between the contras and the Sandinistas at Sapoa m 
March of 1988, created far more positive changes in terms of 
peace and political openings in Nicaragua, than years of contra 
war. The acceptance of the Tela agreement was yet .ai~other 
indication that the Sandinista Governme~t. was willm?" to 
respond to political opportunity, not military coerc10n. 
Although success in the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador 
have been far more limited, the Esquipulas a".c?r~s have 
strengthened internal forces that backed reconciliation and 
reform and opened some possibilities for refugees to return. 
'While it is never publicly admitted, there see~s to be a 
presumption in the U.S. that lesser develo~ed and ~mpove~­
ished nations do not produce intellect_ually agile an~ d~plomati­
cally astute individuals. But the delivery of negotiat10ns that 
have taken place over the last ten year~ b'.l~e this b.elief. The 
Central Americans understand the viability .of diplomacy. 
Costa Rica has negotiated a border agreement with ~icaragua, 
and an information arrangement operates to deal with bo~~er 
tensions between Honduras and Nicaragua. Indeed, .the ability 
to orchestrate the Equipulas and Tela agreements m the fa".e 
of the pressures coming from th~ _D.S. is. ~ test~ment ~ their 
concern and competence for deVIsmg pohtical/diplomatic solu-
tions to the problems in the region. . .. 
What they lack-resources and technical .capabilities to 
organize monitoring groups, verification commissions an~ so 
on, could be provided with the help of the OAS. and the Umted 
States. But, as Central American leaders .will tell you, the 
major obstacle to effective regional diplomatic efforts has been 
the lack of genuine support from the U.S.9 
7. Pursing an unpopular, interventionist strategy 
abroad is damaging to the institutions of our own con-
stitutional democracy here at home. . 
This lesson, only partially lefi:rned f7om the Vietnam 
experience was brought to the fore once agam when the Iran-
Contra sc~dal broke. It was opposition to the contra war that 
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led high administration officials to lie, break the law, circum-
vent Congress, and privatize foreign policy making in their 
efforts to keep the contra war alive. Because it is costly to pur-
sue such interventionist strategies (in terms of U.S. lives) it is 
likely that strong opposition will continue and so will the risks 
to democracy here at home. 
FORGING A NEW POLICY 
Both the conservatives and the liberals find some 
lessons easier to learn than others. The liberals understand 
the failures of rollback and the damaging consequences of aid 
to repressive militaries; conservatives easily learn the lessons 
about the failures of economic aid and political pressure to pre-
vent revolutions. But it is very difficult for either side to learn 
all the lessons. If a particular blend of carrots and sticks -
economic aid and military assistance, elections and counterin-
surgency, human rights and free fire zones, diplomatic pres-
sures and contra aid- does not work either to create democra-
cy and reform, or prevent revolutions, or eliminate leftist 
governments then both sides assume that we must simply 
readjust the ingredients in the recipe. Because the United 
States still has such tremendous military and economic influ-
ence in the region it is hard to learn that the old dictim is not 
longer (if it ever was) applicable: we can not control the inter-
nal destinies of these countries.10 Both sides see this as simple 
"giving up" on U.S. interests. Since this is clearly unacceptable 
to them, the debate erroneously returns to what proportions to 
mix together. 
What is ignored, then, is the most important and diffi-
cult lesson to learn: Giving up control over internal affairs does 
not mean abandoning U.S. interests; quite the contrary, it 
would allow us to promote real US interests more effectively.11 
Take, for example, security interests. We must prevent 
the Soviet Union from using Central America to threaten the 
United States militarily. The stationing of Soviet missiles there 
would be as unacceptable now as it was in 1962, when the 
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Soviets sought to place missiles in Cuba. There is no public evi-. 
dence that using Central America this way has ever been an 
intention of the Soviets. Aside from their intentions, however, 
the recent developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
. Union make that kind of offensive move less and less likely 
eacli day. 
· It is also important for the United States to assure 
access to the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea lanes. But 
we could far more effectively protect these interest if we 
stopped mucking around trying to destabilize the Sandinistas 
and trying to manage El Salvador's internal affairs and, 
instead, dealt directly with the Soviets. Washington must 
make clear that we would respond with overwhelming force if 
such actions were threatened, in effect extending to the entire 
region the kind of understanding prohibiting the stationing of 
strategic weapons, worked out between President Kennedy 
and the Soviets over Cuba, and later reaffirmed by the Nixon 
administration. 
We also have a strong interest in encouraging regional 
peace. Current regional conflicts disrupt growth, divert funds 
for investment and reform into military expenditures, increase 
unemployment and poverty, and displace tens of thousands of 
people. The U.S. feels the impact directly in terms of increased 
immigration pressures. Such conflicts also heighten border 
tensions and threaten to spill over into regional war which 
would jeopardize trade and investment. 
Yet the very attempts to destabilize the Nicaraguan 
government have resulted in intensifying such regional con-
flicts and clocking promising peace accords. The Sandinista's 
nationalist concern with internal development already makes 
aggression by them highly unlikely, as does the widespread· 
understanding that such action would bring a disastrous mili-
tary confrontation with the United States. If there were incllca-
tions of hostile intentions (incidents have occurred in the past, 
such as the 1969 Honduran-Salvadoran "soccer war") we 
could most effectively discourage or stop them by working 
within the collective security arrangements of the Rio Treaty: 
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that would bring to bear multilateral pressures (to which all 
the_ coun_tries, ~eluding Nicaragua, are very sensitive) incorpo-
ratmg diplomatic and economic sanctions and force if neces-
sary. Similarly, concerns about significan't support for insur-
gents in neighboring countries-if there were credible evi-
dence7ould be taken to the OAS and handled through the 
appropriate clauses of the Rio Treaty, and multilateral sanc-
tions sought to halt that aid. Insistence on controlling 
Nicaraguan politics has discouraged Washington from testing 
Managua's offers to negotiate verifiable agreements to assure 
that no arms flow out of Nicaragua through Honduras to EI 
Salvador, or flow through Honduran based contras back into 
Nicaragua. 
In short, the potentially disruptive foreign actions of 
Central American countries can much more effectively be han-
dled by dealin~ direct!?' :Mth the behavior. Putting U.S. energy 
and resource~ mto dec1dmg what kind of government a country 
should have lS not only costly, but may actually undermine our 
interests in regional peace. 
U.S. economic interests in Central America are relative-
ly modest--the region does not provide us with any strategic 
'.esource~. Howeve7 the U.S.'s interest in peace does imply an 
mterest m promotmg broadly shared, equitable development: 
hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, and disease create justifiable 
causes for discontent and demands to redress the situation. 
Further, such problems intensify pressures for northward 
migration, and should themselves be a concern to a country 
that values human life and dignity. But ironically, there are a 
number of ways in which the effort to manage internal affairs 
undermines such equitable development. 
. For examp~e, the necessary condition for such develop-
ment is some modicum of regional peace; but U.S. insistence on 
k~eping, or getting, the left out of power in EI Salvador and 
Nicaragua has blocked efforts at negotiating a reduction in 
c?nfli~t. The continued war has simply eaten up U.S. economic 
aid "."1th few developmental results. Further, the efforts to con-
trol mternal conflicts have often led the U.S. to ally itself with 
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military and economic elites that oppose needed reforms so the 
effort to help "guarantee stability" undermines the possibility 
for broadly shared development. The U.S. may initially insist 
on reform as a condition for aid, but when electoral fraud, 
harassment and violence leads would be reformers to turn to 
·demonstrations, sit-ins, land seizures and even armed insur-
. gency, control of these disruptive elements generally becomes 
primary. U.S. interests in long term peace and development 
demand living with a certain amount of disruption and conflict 
in the region instead of rushing to aid reactionary forces. 
Development itself is unlikely to be broadly shared 
unless the citizens of each country are organized to demand 
reform and can participate in the planning and administration 
of development programs. Long term peace is unlikely if mili-
tary, political, or economic elites repress such reform efforts. 
But the presumption of control actually undermines U.S. 
efforts to promote real democracy. Although the term "democ-
ratization" has recently been distorted and devalued by many 
conservatives to justify aid for contra forces and the 
Salvadoran military, the United States does have an interest 
in promoting democracy.12 
Liberals anxious to keep revolutionaries out of power 
may initially favor democracy. They understand that an end to 
repression, and popular participation moderate the pressures 
for revolution. But if reactionary military and economic elites 
will not open up the process (eg. are not willing to give elected 
reformers power) and revolution is threatened, the overriding 
desire to establish and maintain order often leads to a redefin-
ing of democracy-relying heavily on formalistic criteria like 
the mere holding of elections-so as to justify military and eco-
nomic aid. Further, there is a temptation to hush up our con-
cerns with more basic conditions that eventually could promote 
democracy-the right to organize and demonstrate, the protec-
tion of dissidents and of a free press, respect for fundamental 
human rights-because making a fuss about these things 
would highlight the face of repression and undermine support 
for aid . 
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The U.S. must not give up on promoting real democracy, 
but we do need to learn that this is not a problem of "better 
~anag?ment": or more skillfu~ly blending carrots and sticks. 
n the immediate future, the history and conditions, for exam-
pl~, ?f El Salvador and Guatemala, make democracy an unre-
alistic and unattainable goal: the U.S. does not have that kind 
of power. Judging the success of policies by their ability to a-
chieve. demo:racy-making "democratization" the central goal 
of poh~y-will create a gap between expectation and rarity 
that_ ~i.11 needlessly undermine domestic and international 
credibility. Worse, it may blind us to the relatively more mod-
est. steps that could be taken to encourage those conditions 
which som~day_may make democracy more likely: speaking up 
for th_ose imprisoned or tortured or censored; publicly con-
de~~g, and refusing to aid, governments (independent of 
their ideolo!lY) that engage in gross and systematic violations 
of human nghts; and ';orking with other countries to support 
the e~ort:i of human nghts monitors and international rights 
organizations. 
The focus on getting or keeping the left out of power 
hampers our encouragement of development and democracy in 
an even more subtle way: it is only when internal turmoil rais-
es th? spectra of revolution that the U.S. pays attention to 
~uch issues. When order is restored, our concern shifts. What 
is forgotten is that long term U.S. security interests are best 
served by having neighboring countries whose citizens feel 
sec.ure, ha_ve. decent_ life chances, and are not repressed. · 
N~ither bmld~g bamers of containment nor rolling back the 
alien hordes gives as much security as building a good neigh-
borhood. Ye_t t~e short t.:rm focus on maintaining control in an 
effort to ehmma~e a misconceived and overinflated security 
~hreat, ac.tually discourages U.S. policy makers from formulat-
~g the _kmds of multil~teral, long term efforts-for encourag-
mg ~egional tra~e, easmg the debt burden, resolving armed 
conflicts, promoting human rights-that might encourage the 
development and decency that would constitute a foundation 
for durable peace and real security. 
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When American policy makers learn that they do not 
have to take responsibility for managing the internal affairs of 
Central America in order to pursue U.S. interests, they can put 
forward sound and reasonable policies.13 'lb minimize Soviet 
military influence in the region, diminish any threat that these 
. countries might pose to each other or to us, and promote peace, 
economic recovery, and real democracy we could adopt the fol-
lowing policy guidelines: 
1. De-escalate superpower rivalry in the region. 
Minimizing this East-West component means working to elimi-
nate the dependence of local forces on either the Soviet Union 
or the United States for external military support. The prima-
ry responsibility for tl!is lies with the U.S., because it is the 
primary "East-West" actor in Central America. 
2. De-militarize the region. That means finding ways to 
limit the regional arms race, keeping advance weaponry (par-
ticularly aircraft and missiles) out of the region, encouraging 
the build-down of armed forces, assisting with mechanisms to 
minimize the cross border flows of arms shipments to insur-
gents in neighboring countries, and looking to develop alterna-
tive, non-violent mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts. 
3. End all support for illegal mercenary activity. That 
means not only ending direct military aid for the contras, but 
ending the entire contra-type policy-the CIA intelligence and 
logistics support, the funneling of aid through third countries 
or private sources, the non-lethal military aid. That also means 
shouldering our responsibility to find a decent and humane 
way to resettle these exiles in Nicaragua or elsewhere, and 
help neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica with the associated 
refugee problems. To do less would be to leave in place armed 
bands that could wreak havoc on the region for years. 
4. Promote broadly shared development. That means 
working to restore regional trade, encourage U.S. Central 
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American trade, and promote mechanisms of debt relief that 
will free up national funds for investment and reform, not sim-
ply to make interest payments on debts. But it means more 
than promoting growth. It also means encouraging efforts at struc~al reform--land reform, for example, and programs in e~ucation, health, and housing-that will more equitably dis-
tribute the benefits of growth to the majority of the population. 
Such reforms will inevitably be turbulent and conflictual, and 
must not lead to the panicky or knee-jerk responses of the past 
which resulted in destroying them and providing the oligarchy 
and military with the tools to reinforce their dominant politi-
cal, economic and social position. 
5. Promote the strengthening of democratic in-
stitutions, values and practices. That means more than ~imply encouraging the election of civilians. It means promot-
mg the full political participation of all non-violent groups and 
parties, of the right, center, and left; championing protection of 
press freedom not only from censorship but from officially tol-
erated .or supported violence against it; and encouraging the 
protection of party and union activists, human rights monitors, 
and election officials from threats, disappearances, arrests and 
torture. 
6. Re-establish the primacy of diplomacy, ·negotiated 
settlements, and promote multilateral approaches to 
regional problems. Multilateral does not mean inviting other 
countries to lend support for plans the U.S. has formulated. It 
means a true partnership with regional allies. And an empha-
sis on diplomacy does not mean eschewing force as an instru-
ment of!ast resort in instances where there is a clear and pre-
sent danger to the security of the United States. But it does 
mean recognizing diplomacy and cooperation as the first 
resort, and understanding that negotiated solutions are far 
more effective and lasting than ones imposed by force. 
Concretely, it means throwing the full weight of the U.S. 
behind regional efforts to promote peace, and taking steps to 
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promote a political settlement to end all regional conflicts. 
IMPLEMENTING A NEW POLICY: 
OVERCOMING THE ROADBLOCKS 
The Bush Administration can and sho.uld ~ove q1:'ickly 
to implement policies based on these gmdelmes. Firmly 
putting forward concrete measures to reduce super-power 
rivalry and de-escalate conflicts wo.ul~ go a long ~ay toward 
diffusing irrational fears and convmcmg the pubhc that the 
administration understands, and can deal wit~'. ~ea! thr~ats 
and promote real security. A first step wo_uld be mitiating bda~­
eral discussions with Nicaragua to negotiate all ~utual secun-
ty concerns. It should be possible to make rapid. progr~~s on 
reaching verifiable agreements prohi~i.ting fore.ign rmhtary 
bases in Nicaragua, reducing foreign =!ita~ advisors ?n both 
sides and setting up international momtonng mechamsms on 
the Nicaragua-Honduran border to minimize cross border arms 
flows and incursions. 
Another step would be to throw fi~m U.~. support 
behind regional peace efforts. This would q1:'ickly distan~e the 
United States from responsibility for the mten;-al affairs of 
Nicaragua, and perhaps even El Salvador; and it would pro-
vide a forum for encouraging a full peace agre7ment between 
the contras and the Sandinistas as well as multilatt:ral mecha-
nisms for dismantling the contra forces and resettling the sol-
diers and their families. The Esquipulas and Tela a~cords 
might still form a basis for a regional effort, and other rmpor-
tant forces (Mexico, Venezuela, the Church, the OAS, C~ada 
and some of our European allies). coul.d help ~reate a. regio~al 
framework for resolving this conflict-if Washmgton signals its 
strong support. 'bil"t 
Policy makers could also quietly probe the possi_ 1 Y 
for pursuing Gorbachev's original offer t? former. President 
Reagan to negotiate reductions of arn;is shipments m th~ con-
text of a regional settlement along the lines of the Esqmpulas 
II accords. Taking such concrete steps would help remove the 
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overemphasis on Cold War tensions in Central America and 
allow attention to shift to the rest of Latin America where seri-
ous problems need urgent consideration. 
S~rious problems would still remain, but the more they 
are publicly defined for what they are-primarily regional 
developmenta! problems? not East-West ones-the greater lati-
tude there will be ~or implementing rational policies. Such 
efforts, however, will also face important obstacles here at 
ho~7: the U.S. does .not have a great capability to carry out P?lic1~s that s~ heavily emphasize diplomacy, and new policy 
directioi:s are likely to face vocal domestic opposition. 
. . Smee 194'.7, t~e _D.S. has put massive sums of money into buildi~g ai:d mamtammg its military capability. But, relatively 
speak.mg, httle effort has been made to develop and maintain the 
capac1~y to conduct diplomacy. The past nine years have been no 
except1oi: to that t:7nd. When one considers how much money 
"'.as put 1:1to ~h~ military and how little into beefing up the For-
eign Service, it is not surprising to see the difference between the 
overly abundant and sophisticated capabilities of the former and 
the threadbase resources of the latter. 
~he pro~lem of this "diplomacy gap" is all the greater as 
th_e foreign affairs. n~eds have grown so much over these years, ~1th th~ dram~tic mcrease in the number of new nations, 
issues, mtemat~onal organizations and conferences. Yet, the 
U.S. has a fore1~ service which has not kept up. They are understaffe~ and ~adequately trained. The system of rewards 
and promotion, remforced by the foreign service subculture 
conduces to conformism and mitigates against comprehensive' 
carefully crafted, accurate and incisive reporting. This proble~ 
was .greatly ~x~.cerbated during the Reagan years when "sup-
portmg the .lme was considered by many to be more important 
than reportmg accurately. 
Unfortunately, no better case exemplifies this than that 
of Central America. Even before the Reagan administration took 
~~~~'.the demand for ideological conformity was made clear A ~1t hst of am~assadors was developed and the new administ~a­
tion purged Virtually the entire set of foreign service officers 
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who· had Central American regional experience and replaced 
them often with those whose principal service had been in 
Southeast Asia or Soviet Bloc countries. 
What is needed immediately in Central America is the 
placement of skilled, highly competent foreign service officers 
·thoroughly knowledgeable about the region. They must be 
. given clear instructions that reporting should be an accurate 
reflection of the reality on the ground in the region, and should 
not be designed in accord with some preordained administra-
tion position back in Washington. And they ~ust be e'.11~w­
ered to utilize their diplomatic skills in pursumg negotiations 
and political settlements to the conflicts in the region. 
There are often obstacles in the U.S. to this policy. One 
problem is the deeply rooted assumption, so ingrained ~to the 
national political psyche, that Americans are responsible for 
managing the internal affairs of countries on its borders ~nd 
preventing revolutions that have long been defined as equiva-
lent to takeovers by hostile powers. This problem has been 
heightened by both Reagan and Bush administration rhetoric 
aimed at creating the image that continued Sandinista rule 
threatens vital U.S. security interests. 
Given this context, the administration needs to talk 
calmly and honestly about Central American reality and U.S. 
interests there. It needs to counter the conservative's obsession 
with Central America by locating regional policies in the larger 
context of new global and hemispheric policies. It is tinle to 
take advantage of the Gorbachev era to wind down the cold 
war and demilitarize regional conflicts. It is time to encourage 
cooperative efforts to deal with pressing issues like spurring 
growth at home and in Latin America, easing the burde?-~ of 
debt, initiating reforms that relieve hunger and malnutnt1?n, 
tackling international environmental problems, and copmg 
with other sensitive problems such as migration and narcotics. 
Certain factors favor this redefinition of the problem. A 
majority of the U.S. public has consistently opposed the conser-
vative's contra policy, and there is widespread suspicion that 
the Reagan Administration was less than honest about its 
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involvement in the region. There is also the atmosphere of 
improving relations with the Soviet Union and evidence of a 
Soviet commitment to reduce its interventionist role in the 
Third World. Further, because the new policy demands less 
control i~ is also less costly. It will be difficult to get 
Congress10nal approval for regional economic aid or trade 
arrangements in a time of deficits if the banner of anticommu-
nism can no longer be waved. But the administration would 
not be fanning the same rancorous flames that engulfed efforts 
to get aid for the Salvadoran military before 1984, or the con-
tras after 1984. 
No amount of rational policy argument is likely to 
change quickly an imperative that is so deeply ingrained. 
Opponents of a new direction are only going to be convinced 
that the U.S. should deal with the region in a new way when 
they see that such policies actually work to enhance real 
!nterests-and the sky does not fall when the U.S. stops try-
mg to control "destinies." But in order to implement these 
policies and demonstrate that they can work, the administra-
tion must be prepared for a potential difficulty. Its best 
efforts to put Central America on the back burner, and pro-
ceed cautiously and quietly so as not to inflame passions, 
may face vocal, well organized opposition by conservatives 
who have long made Central America a litmus test for a poli-
cy makers' political bonifides. Former administration offi-
ci~ls, :iiublic~y certified as experts by their long experience, 
will likely mhabit conservative think tanks or join the 
already quite conservative class of Washington pundits, and 
may try to use these positions to make Central America a 
"test" of the administration's willingness to be tough, stand 
tall, and protect America. 
Under such circumstances, the administration needs a 
strong defense of its policies if it is not to suffer the same fate 
that President Carter suffered when the right organized (in 
groups like the Committee on the Present Danger) to block, 
almost successfully, the Panama Canal treaties, to block the 
Salt II treaty, and to blast his administration for allowing the 
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hostage crisis and the defeat of Somoza by the Sandinistas. 
The obstacles created by such right wing attacks co~!? be c?m-
pounded if some regional crisis engulfs the ad~mistrabon. 
Although it is reasonable to be concerned about Nicaragua, the 
events that might spark such a crisis-an unprovoked 
·Sandinista renewal of the war or a really severe government 
· crackdown-are not likely to occur. El Salvador, however, pre-
sents greater possibility for trouble. 
PREPARING FOR ANOTHER SALVADORAN "SURPRISE" 
Nine years ago, at the _Hm~ of .the last presidential 
transition in this country, the situation m E.l Salvador explod-
ed on the front pages and became the occasion for th~ Reagan 
Administration to draw the line against commumsm a~d 
defme the outlines of what proved to be an unsuccessful poli:y 
toward the region. The current tense ~ituation could agam 
rapidly deteriorate, triggering conservative dem~ds that the 
administration do something about internal affairs there. If 
policy makers are not prepared to deal with it, ~d ;espond 
reflexively from old visions, they could get l~cked ~n m way.s 
that made later extrication-let alone a reonentat10n of poli-
cy-difficult. . . . The current Salvadoran situation is bemg dnven by a 
number of closely connected dynamics. The gue.rrill~s, stron~ 
militarily, are looking to take advan~.ge of detenorating ~ond1-
tions to improve their military pos1t10n and, short of vict~ry, 
force serious negotiations with the armed forces. Meanwhil~, 
the ultra right, organized around the ARENA .party, sees their 
recent electoral victories as the chance to gam co~plete gov-
ernment control, dismantle reforms, and put. back m place the 
anti-reformist oligarchic project they led until 1979. L~bor and 
peasant organizations have been bracing for the reactions they 
feE . d . tin The internal situation in El Salvador is etei::ora ~ as 
land and other reforms are gutted and the repression agamst 
labor and peasant organizations increases. Moderate, formerly 
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pro-Christian ·Democratic organizations, unsupported and 
unprotected by the new government, have been moving to the 
left and joining independent and leftist unions in widespread 
demonstrations and protests.· The 'FMLN is likely to continue 
to increase its military activity and strengthen links to the 
urban movements. 
AB the deterioration continues, the Salvadoran military, 
conservatives in Congress, and some State Department, 
Pentagon and CIA officials, will pressure the administration to 
act quickly so as not to "lose another country." They are likely 
to paint such a situation as a test case of administration "will" 
and "toughness," overestimate the threat, and recommend 
steps that will lock the administration into reaffirming support 
for an ultra-rightist, and probably quite brutal, government. 
How might the administration, faced with an elected 
ultra-rightist government and a deteriorating internal situa-
tion, respond? It would need a policy that distances itself from 
the ultra-rightist government while creating multilateral sup-
port for a negotiated solution. Such immediate steps might 
include the following: 
First, the U.S. could encourage regional actors with 
good relations to the FDR/FMLN, ARENA and the military to 
set up a framework, involving the best aspects of the 
Esquipulas II and Tela accords and the Contadora process, to 
help encourage internal reconciliation. The talks between the 
current government aud the FMLN present a tremendous 
opportunity for such an effort. AB of the present they have been 
used by the ARENA Government more to posture than to nego-
tiate. The Church, the OAS, and certain European countries, 
as well as the Socialist International and the Christian 
Democratic international could also play important roles in 
bringing about a viable, though undoubtedly protracted, nego-
tiation process. Strengthening such efforts would increase the 
changes for a negotiated solution, and decrease the responsibil-
ity of the U.S. for a particular outcome in El Salvador. 
Second, the U.S. could make clear to the Salvadoran 
government that it does not think a military solution to the 
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t conflict is either possible or desirable. The level. of 
cu~en ted m' the administration's budget must rem-
assistance presen . · f mili-
force this message: there must be a noticeable !owermlgto d 
"d d a shift away from the current war-re a ". eco-~:~~1aid~ward assistance aimed at humanitarian relief and 
refugee resettlement. h 
. Third, the U.S. could send clear messages tot e .govern-
. th mili't d the ARENA party that U.S. aid to El 
ment e ary an . b Salv~dor is contingent on an end to human ng~ts a uses. . 
Quickly putting into place the steps outlined abov'." mi~ht 
d . . t t' to redefine the Salvadoran s1tuat10n enable the a mims ra ion . . d 
nationally and internationally before there is another ~~sis, an 
create some room for maneuver, but the pressure to o some-
thing" will still be very great. Policy makers must thus be pre-
ared to draw a very clear line, beyond which they wil~ n?t go to 
protect the Salvadoran military and oligarchy, an~ to ms1st that 
~negotiated solution is the only workable a!ternativ~. 
The Bush administration has the opportumty to define, 
. . d · · I d ew policies for the hem1-
skillfully realistic an prmcip e n . 1 ~ s here A deteriorating situation in El Salvador is no p a~e or 
. P · b d d 14 Immediate and careful preparation to it to get ogge own. . f t 
e with the potential crises could avoid .the da?-g".r o. ye ~ther administration fmding itself perenmally stickmg itself 
to the Central American tar baby. 
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